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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Sixteen Pennsylvania hospitals brought this suit against 
various tobacco companies and their trade associations, 
seeking to recover unreimbursed costs of health care 
provided to nonpaying patients suffering from tobacco- 
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related disease. The hospitals alleged that the tobacco 
companies engaged in a conspiracy lasting more than 40 
years to manipulate the nicotine content in cigarettes and 
other tobacco products. They alleged that the tobacco 
companies deceived and misled the public about the 
addictive properties of nicotine and the health risks of 
smoking. As a result, many people used tobacco and 
developed lung cancer and other tobacco-related illnesses. 
The hospitals expended significant resources treating these 
tobacco users, and now seek recovery of their expenses 
under federal antitrust and RICO provisions, as well as 
state common law theories. 
 
In Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000) [hereinafter Steamfitters], this 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of similar claims brought by 
union health and welfare funds, reasoning that the funds' 
injuries were too remote from, and not proximately caused 
by, the tobacco companies' alleged wrongdoing. Relying on 
Steamfitters, the District Court dismissed the hospitals' 
claims. The hospitals appeal. We hold that because the 
hospitals' damages are too speculative and their injuries 
are too remote from the tobacco companies' alleged 
wrongdoing, proximate cause is lacking, and thus the 
hospitals do not have standing to sue. We therefore affirm. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
The appellants are sixteen charitable not-for-profit 
Pennsylvania hospitals (the "Hospitals"). 1 They are licensed 
under the Pennsylvania Health Care Facilities Act, 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. SS 448.101-448.904b, and are required by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Hospitals are: (1) Allegheny General Hospital; (2) Allegheny Valley 
Hospital; (3) Armstrong County Memorial Hospital; (4) Canonsburg 
General Hospital; (5) Carbon-Schuylkill Community Hospital, Inc. d/b/a 
Miners Memorial Medical Center; (6) Chambersburg Hospital; (7) Forbes 
Regional Hospital; (8) Hazleton -- St. Joseph Medical Center; (9) Lehigh 
Valley Hospital; (10) Muhlenberg Hospital Center; (11) Northeastern 
Pennsylvania Corporation d/b/a Hazleton General Hospital; (12) Saint 
Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem; (13) St. Luke's -- Allentown Campus; (14) 
St. Luke's Quakertown Hospital; (15) Saint Vincent Health; and (16) 
Waynesboro Hospital. 
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Pennsylvania law to provide health care to Medicaid, 
medically indigent, and nonpaying patients (collectively 
"nonpaying patients"), see 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 449.8(a). 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not fully 
reimburse the Hospitals for health care provided to these 
patients. The Hospitals therefore bear the financial burden 
of their care. The defendants are various producers of 
tobacco products and their trade associations (the"Tobacco 
Companies").2 
 
The Hospitals allege that, over a 40 year period, the 
Tobacco Companies conspired to conceal from the public 
the medical risks and addictive nature of tobacco and to 
limit information that might reduce the sales of tobacco 
products. This effort involved the suppression of scientific 
research on safer tobacco products and on methods of 
reducing individual consumption. It also involved false 
affirmative representations of tobacco use as a safe or even 
beneficial activity. The Hospitals allege that, as a result of 
this conspiracy, millions of Americans smoked, chewed, 
and snuffed tobacco. Many developed lung cancer, oral 
cancer, heart disease, and a host of other serious 
afflictions. Some tobacco users had health insurance or the 
resources to pay for treatment. But others, for whatever 
reason, were medically indigent and could not afford health 
care -- i.e., the nonpaying patients. 
 
The Tobacco Companies allegedly knew that the burden 
of treating these patients would fall on direct health care 
providers, such as the Hospitals. In fact, the Hospitals 
claim that from the inception of the conspiracy, the 
Tobacco Companies intended to shift to the Hospitals the 
cost of diagnosing and treating tobacco-related diseases 
suffered by nonpaying patients. They do not claim that the 
Tobacco Companies are legally liable to the tobacco users 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Tobacco Companies are: (1) Philip Morris, Inc.; (2) R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company; (3) Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; (4) 
B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C.; (5) The American Tobacco Company, Inc. c/o 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; (6) Lorillard Tobacco 
Company; (7) The Ligget Group, Inc.; (8) United States Tobacco 
Company; (9) The Tobacco Institute, Inc.; (10) The Council for Tobacco 
Research -- U.S.A., Inc.; (11) Smokeless Tobacco Council, Inc.; and (12) 
Hill & Knowlton, Inc. 
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themselves. Rather, the Tobacco Companies are allegedly 
liable to the Hospitals for the Hospitals' unreimbursed 
expenses, which reportedly amounted to millions of dollars 
each year. 
 
The Hospitals' allegations encompass two theories-- an 
indirect injury theory and a direct injury theory. 3 Under the 
indirect injury theory, the Hospitals allege that, through 
deception, the Tobacco Companies caused nonpaying 
patients to smoke, inducing significant tobacco-related 
diseases. The law required the Hospitals to provide 
treatment to these patients regardless of their ability to pay 
for it. The Hospitals therefore reason that the Tobacco 
Companies' wrongful acts increased the unreimbursed 
costs the Hospitals incurred. 
 
Under the direct injury theory, the Hospitals allege that 
the Tobacco Companies' conspiracy to conceal information 
about the risks of tobacco, and to prevent the development 
of safer cigarettes and alternative nicotine delivery devices, 
hampered the Hospitals' efforts to reduce tobacco 
consumption among nonpaying patients. In other words, if 
the Tobacco Companies had not conspired, the Hospitals 
could have more effectively counseled patients to quit 
smoking or use safer products, reducing the health care 
costs of treating tobacco-related disease. 
 
The Hospitals seek recovery under various legal theories, 
including claims under federal antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. 
SS 1-37a, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. S 1962, and state 
common law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation and 
omission, breach of special duty, public nuisance, aiding 
and abetting, indemnity based on intentional conduct, 
restitution, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and civil 
conspiracy. In response, all but two of the Tobacco 
Companies filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in the District Court 
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. The District Court granted the 
motion, holding that the Hospitals' federal antitrust and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We import this useful terminology from Chief Judge Becker's 
discussion in Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 919-20. 
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RICO claims were based on remote and indirect injuries 
and on an attenuated theory of causation, and that 
therefore the Hospitals lacked standing to bring those 
claims. The District Court also found no merit in the 
remaining state common law claims, dismissing them on a 
variety of rationales. 
 
The Hospitals filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the 
parties stipulated that the remaining two Tobacco 
Companies, B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C., and Smokeless 
Tobacco Council, Inc., had joined in the motion to dismiss. 
This stipulation rendered the District Court's orderfinal 
and appealable as to all the Tobacco Companies. We 
therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. See 
Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (N.Y.), 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 
(3d Cir. 1986) (actual finality cures an earlier jurisdictional 
defect); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 
F.2d 387, 389 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981), aff 'd sub nom. Union 
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (later 
stipulation of dismissal as to a remaining defendant 
rendered earlier order final and appealable). 
 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 919. In 
judging that dismissal, we take all the Hospitals' factual 
allegations as true, and affirm only if "it is certain that no 
relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be 
proved." See City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 
F.3d 256, 262 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 
II. Federal Claims - Antitrust and RICO Claims 
 
This case presents an issue of first impression in this 
Circuit: whether hospitals, with a legal duty to provide 
unreimbursed medical care to nonpaying patients suffering 
from tobacco-related disease, have standing to assert 
antitrust and RICO claims against tobacco companies. 
Apart from the Court below, we have found only one district 
court that has directly considered the issue. See Association 
of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 79 F. Supp. 
2d 1219 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (dismissing the claims). 
 
Our analysis of the Hospitals' claims nevertheless draws 
guidance from the closely analogous Steamfitters decision, 
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where a group of union health and welfare funds, who paid 
for tobacco-related health care for their members, brought 
suit against tobacco companies. In Steamfitters, this Court 
affirmed the dismissal of those union funds' various 
antitrust and RICO claims on the grounds that the union 
funds' injuries were too remote, the injuries were not a 
necessary step to the success of the tobacco companies' 
alleged conspiracy, and the damage claims were too 
speculative and difficult to prove. See 171 F.3d 912. The 
result in Steamfitters is consistent with all the Courts of 
Appeals (as well as numerous district courts) that have 
considered whether health and welfare funds may bring 
such claims. See Lyons v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 99-2843, 
2000 WL 1234272 (8th Cir. Sept. 1, 2000); United Food and 
Commercial Workers Unions, Employers Health and Welfare 
Fund, No. 99-13476, 2000 WL 1190787 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 
2000); Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000); Laborers Local 17 
Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 
(2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 799 (2000); Oregon 
Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 
S. Ct. 789 (2000); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 
734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999). We have found only two 
district court decisions that have decided otherwise. See 
Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 1999); Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 
36 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), as amended sub nom. 
National Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 
74 F. Supp. 2d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Blue 
Cross/Nat'l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund]. 
 
Steamfitters provides an analytic framework for health 
care industry suits against tobacco companies. The key to 
the analysis is that the Hospitals must have standing to 
assert federal antitrust and RICO claims, or those claims 
will be dismissed. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 921 (citing 
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 
268 (1992) (standing for RICO claims) and Blue Shield v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (standing for antitrust 
claims)). Whether the Hospitals have standing depends on 
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whether the Tobacco Companies' alleged conspiracy 
proximately caused the Hospitals' injuries. Proximate 
cause, in turn, depends on, and is intertwined with, the 
remoteness of those injuries. See Steamfitters , 171 F.3d at 
921 ("Remoteness is an aspect of the proximate cause 
analysis, in that an injury that is too remote from its causal 
agent fails to satisfy tort law's proximate cause requirement 
. . ."). 
 
The Hospitals raise antitrust and RICO claims that are 
essentially identical to those the union funds raised in 
Steamfitters. Therefore, Steamfitters  controls and requires 
dismissal unless there is some relevant difference between 
the alleged injuries that the Hospitals suffered here and the 
alleged injuries that the union funds suffered in 
Steamfitters. The Hospitals allege numerous differences, but 
we only see three substantive ones.4 The union funds in 
Steamfitters were entities financed through member dues or 
fees that voluntarily paid health care providers to treat their 
members. By contrast, the Hospitals in this case (1) have a 
legal duty to provide medical care to nonpaying patients, (2) 
directly provide medical care, rather than paying another 
health care entity to provide it, and (3) provide care without 
reimbursement. We now turn to the import of these 
differences. 
 
A. Standing as Quasi-Governmental Entities  
 
Emphasizing their legal duty to provide health care, the 
Hospitals first argue that, unlike the union funds in 
Steamfitters, they have "quasi-governmental" standing. 
They assert that the State of Pennsylvania, through the 
creation of a legal duty to provide care and through a 
myriad of licensing and medical statutes, delegated to the 
Hospitals the traditional public function of providing health 
care to those without means. According to the Hospitals, 
this delegated power entails a quasi-governmental right -- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For example, the Hospitals argue that the Tobacco Companies 
specifically intended to harm them, and that the Hospitals are not 
traditional insurers with subrogation rights. Despite the Hospitals' 
statements to the contrary, the union funds raised these same points in 
Steamfitters. See id. at 921 n.4 (discussing subrogation), 925-26 
(discussing specific intent to harm). 
 
                                11 
 
 
as found in state governments -- to sue Tobacco 
Companies on behalf of nonpaying patients without regard 
to proximate cause. In response, the Tobacco Companies 
argue that the Hospitals, as private entities, lack the 
prerequisites of such standing -- i.e., either an authorizing 
statute or government status. We agree with the Tobacco 
Companies. 
 
State governments have standing to sue tobacco 
companies for damages suffered when paying for smoking- 
related illnesses, without regard to proximate cause. See 
Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 
243-44. This standing may proceed from two sources: (1) a 
statutory provision that grants an entity the right to sue, 
see Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 934 n.18; see also Laborers 
Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 243 (listing 
numerous examples); or (2) a government's "political power" 
and "threat of legislative action" combined with its parens 
patriae right to protect the health and welfare of its citizens, 
see Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 934 n.18; see also Texas v. 
American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962-63 (E.D. 
Tex. 1997). 
 
The Hospitals cannot call on either of these sources. They 
do not act under a statutory provision allowing them to 
sue. Nor are they a state government entity, possessing 
political power or the threat of legislative action sufficient to 
invoke parens patriae authority. Therefore, they do not 
have quasi-governmental standing, and they must show 
proximate cause. 
 
The Hospitals attempt to skirt this obvious conclusion by 
citing Blue Cross/Nat'l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund for 
the proposition that nonprofit medical providers occupy a 
parens patriae relationship with their covered populations, 
therefore entitling those providers to quasi-governmental 
standing. See 36 F. Supp. 2d at 581. The language the 
Hospitals cite, however, does not refer to quasi- 
governmental standing; rather, it simply makes a policy 
point about the important societal role of nonprofit medical 
providers. That the District Court in Blue Cross/Nat'l 
Asbestos Workers Medical Fund still required a showing of 
proximate cause by the plaintiffs undercuts the Hospitals' 
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argument. See id. at 573.5 A parens patriae suit, by 
definition, involves the government as the real party in 
interest. See Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (7th ed. 1999) 
(parens patriae is "[a] doctrine by which a government has 
standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen") 
(emphasis added); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) ("[i]n order to 
maintain a [parens patriae] action . . . the State must be 
more than a nominal party"); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of 
Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 (1972) ("the right of a State to 
sue as parens patriae"). Though the Hospitals undoubtedly 
have an important role in today's society, their status does 
not remotely approach that of a government. Having 
rejected quasi-governmental standing, we proceed to 
proximate cause. 
 
B. The Steamfitters Analysis 
 
       1. Antitrust Claims 
 
Proximate cause is a requirement for antitrust claims 
because "[i]t is reasonable to assume that Congress did not 
intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an 
antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold 
damages for the injury to his business or property." 
McCready, 457 U.S. at 477. Determinations of proximate 
cause depend largely on a case-by-case factor analysis, 
rather than on a bright-line rule. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d 
at 922 (stating that Supreme Court cases repeatedly note 
that " `proximate cause is hardly a rigorous analytic tool' ") 
(quoting McCready, 457 U.S. at 477 n.13). 
 
Steamfitters used two Supreme Court cases, McCready 
and Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., v. California State 
Council of Carpenters, 495 U.S. 519 (1983) [hereinafter 
AGC], as paradigms for evaluating antitrust claims in the 
tobacco context. See 171 F.3d at 922. McCready allows a 
proximate cause finding where injured plaintiffs are an 
essential and necessary part of an alleged antitrust 
conspiracy. AGC, the more recent case, provides a general 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As explained later, the proximate cause reasoning of Blue Cross/Nat'l 
Asbestos Workers Medical Fund is questionable in light of prevailing 
Second Circuit doctrine. 
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analysis for the determination of proximate cause through 
an evaluation of six factors. The Hospitals cannot show that 
the Tobacco Companies' alleged conspiracy proximately 
caused their injuries under either McCready or AGC. They 
therefore lack standing to assert their antitrust claims. 
 
       a. The McCready Analysis 
 
In McCready, Blue Shield subscribers sued Blue Shield 
for antitrust violations, alleging that Blue Shield had 
conspired with psychiatrists to push psychologists out of 
the psychotherapy market by only reimbursing subscribers 
for psychiatrist-provided psychotherapy. See 457 U.S. at 
467. In analyzing proximate cause, the McCready  Court 
"look[ed] (1) to the physical and economic nexus between 
the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2), 
more particularly, to the relationship of the injury alleged 
with those forms of injury about which Congress was likely 
to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct 
unlawful and in providing a private remedy" under the 
antitrust laws. Id. at 478. McCready held that the Blue 
Shield conspiracy proximately caused the subscribers' 
injury because the injury was integral to the conspiracy 
and therefore within Congressional antitrust concern: 
 
       [d]enying reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of 
       treatment was the very means by which it is alleged 
       that Blue Shield sought to achieve its illegal ends. The 
       harm to . . . [the class of subscribers] . . . was a 
       necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged 
       illegal conspiracy. Where the injury alleged is so 
       integral an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there can 
       be no question but that the loss was precisely the type 
       of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely 
       to cause. 
 
Id. at 479 (emphasis added) (quotations and citations 
omitted). Therefore, the subscribers had standing to sue. 
 
Steamfitters followed the reasoning in McCready. It first 
noted that the tobacco companies had "ample reason to 
engage in a conspiracy to prevent safer tobacco products 
from coming on the market, regardless of the relationship 
between the Funds and smokers." 171 F.3d at 923. Thus, 
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the union funds' injuries were not the "means" by which 
the Tobacco Companies achieved their alleged conspiracy; 
nor were the union funds' injuries "necessary" or "integral" 
to the alleged conspiracy.6 See id. The union funds were 
merely ancillary victims of ripple effects from the 
conspiracy; they did not fall within congressional concern, 
and therefore proximate cause and antitrust standing did 
not exist. 
 
Applying this test here, we ask whether "the[T]obacco 
[C]ompanies could have achieved their alleged aims without 
the existence of the [Hospitals] or the relationship between 
the [Hospitals] and [nonpaying patients]." Id. at 923. The 
Hospitals say no, arguing that, unlike the union funds, 
they have a duty to provide medical treatment directly to 
smokers unable to afford treatment. Unlike the union fund 
members, the nonpaying patients could not have obtained 
health care outside the Hospitals; that is, without the 
Hospitals, the nonpaying patients would have died more 
quickly from tobacco-related disease. By keeping them 
alive, the Hospitals were defrauded by the Tobacco 
Companies into maintaining a ready supply of tobacco 
users. 
 
Heinous as this seems, it does not fall within McCready. 
As in Steamfitters, the very existence of smokers would 
have given the Tobacco Companies more than sufficient 
reason to engage in a conspiracy to suppress information, 
safer tobacco products, and research, regardless of the 
existence of the Hospitals. See 173 F.3d at 923. If the 
allegations are true, then the Hospitals may have made the 
conspiracy "more profitable or allowed it to exist longer," 
but that fact alone is insufficient. See id.  at 923. Since the 
Hospitals were not "a necessary step in effecting the ends 
of the alleged illegal conspiracy," proximate cause and 
standing for the Hospitals' antitrust claims do not exist 
under McCready. 457 U.S. at 479. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Hospitals claim that the plaintiffs in Steamfitters did not allege 
that they were integral to the tobacco companies' conspiracy. This is not 
correct. See id., 171 F.3d at 922-23 (union funds alleged that their 
payments were necessary to and the very means of effecting the 
conspiracy). 
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       b. The AGC Analysis 
 
Finding no proximate cause under McCready, we look 
next to AGC. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927. In AGC, a 
labor union sued a contractor's association, alleging that 
the association conspired to restrain union activities by 
coercing third parties and association members into 
entering contracts with nonunion contractors. In holding 
that the union lacked standing to bring antitrust claims, 
AGC outlined six factors for determining proximate cause 
and standing: 
 
       (1) the casual connection between defendant's 
       wrongdoing and plaintiff 's harm; (2) the specific intent 
       of defendant to harm plaintiff; (3) the nature of 
       plaintiff 's alleged injury (and whether it relates to the 
       purposes of the antitrust laws, i.e., ensuring 
       competition within economic markets); (4) "the 
       directness or indirectness of the asserted injury"; (5) 
       whether the "damages claim is . . . highly speculative"; 
       and (6) "keeping the scope of complex antitrust trials 
       within judicially manageable limits," i.e., "avoiding 
       either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one hand, 
       or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on 
       the other." 
 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 924 (quoting AGC, 459 U.S. at 
537-38, 540, 542-44). 
 
Steamfitters applied these factors to the union funds' 
antitrust claims, and found that, while the funds satisfied 
factors one through three, the indirectness of the funds' 
injuries and their highly speculative damage claims, 
subsumed under the principle of remoteness, 
overwhelmingly showed the lack of proximate cause. Here, 
the District Court used the same analysis, and held that 
the alleged conspiracy did not proximately cause the 
Hospitals' injuries. The Hospitals argue that the District 
Court misapplied Steamfitters. The Tobacco Companies 
disagree. We now evaluate these arguments through an 
independent examination of the AGC factors. 
 
        (1) Factor 1: Causal Connection 
 
There is a causal connection between the Tobacco 
Companies' alleged conspiracy and the Hospitals' injuries 
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-- i.e., but-for that alleged conspiracy, the injuries would 
not have arisen. This supports a finding of proximate 
cause. Yet, while a causal connection is necessary for a 
finding of proximate cause, it is not sufficient by itself. See 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 925. 
 
        (2) Factor 2: Specific Intent to Harm  
 
The Hospitals allege that the Tobacco Companies 
specifically intended to shift the costs of the nonpaying 
patients' tobacco-related illnesses to the Hospitals. Citing 
the Restatement of Torts and a well-known treatise, 7 the 
Hospitals argue that specific intent to harm creates 
proximate cause as a matter of law. Yet, as AGC  and 
Steamfitters clearly state, the invocation of specific intent to 
harm does not automatically create standing. See AGC, 459 
U.S. at 537 (specific intent to harm "is not a panacea that 
will enable any complaint to withstand a motion to 
dismiss"); Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 925 ("we do not find 
[the intent to harm] dispositive on the issue of antitrust 
standing"). Intent is simply another factor supporting a 
finding of proximate cause. 
 
        (3) Factor 3: The Nature of the Hospitals' Injury 
 
This factor asks whether the Hospitals' injuries fall within 
the scope of congressional antitrust concerns, and 
specifically, the maintenance of economic competition. See 
AGC, 459 U.S. at 538-39; see also United States v. Topco 
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws . . . 
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as 
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our 
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to .. . 
fundamental personal freedoms."). The intent of the 
antitrust laws covers injuries to "consumers forced to pay 
higher prices for tobacco products or competitors harmed 
by [the Tobacco Companies'] ability to conceal the unsafe 
nature of their products." Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927. 
The District Court found that the Hospitals' injuries, 
however alleged, involved indirect costs from treating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. F. Harper, F. James, O. Gray, The Law of Torts S 6.1, at 270 (2d ed. 
1986) ("all intended consequences are legal or proximate"). 
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nonpaying patients, costs not incurred as a consumer or a 
competitor. Thus, the injuries did not fall within 
congressional antitrust concern. 
 
The Hospitals vigorously disagree. First, they argue that 
construing this factor against their claims effectively 
insulates the Tobacco Companies from private enforcement 
actions. This objection is misplaced. " `Congress did not 
intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages 
for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an 
antitrust violation.' " AGC, 459 U.S. at 534 (quoting Hawaii 
v. Standard Oil Co, 405 U.S. 251, 263 n. 14 (1972)). 
 
Next the Hospitals argue that the District Court erred in 
finding that their claims, alleged as consumers in the 
market for safe cigarettes and for information related to the 
effects of tobacco, were not the type intended to be 
remedied by the antitrust laws. Like the union funds in 
Steamfitters, the Hospitals have an indirect and a direct 
injury theory. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 919-20. The 
indirect theory encompasses the Hospitals' higher health 
care costs from the increased smoking of nonpaying 
patients deceived and misled by the Tobacco Companies. In 
Steamfitters, the Court found that the union funds' similar 
indirect theory did not allege an injury in the capacity of a 
consumer or competitor. See id. at 926-27. Citing 
Steamfitters, the District Court correctly found that the 
Hospitals' indirect theory claims are not of the proper type. 
The Hospitals "are simply some of the many groups or 
individuals suffering the financial or medical repercussions 
of the decades-long marketing of a product that we now 
know is demonstrably unsafe." Id. at 927. 
 
The Hospitals' direct injury theory includes allegations, 
however, that the Hospitals were consumers of information 
and alternative nicotine delivery devices, and that the 
Tobacco Companies' suppression of this market prevented 
the Hospitals from successfully counseling nonpaying 
patients to stop smoking or to use safer cigarettes. This 
suppression allegedly prevented the Hospitals from 
reducing health care costs. These injuries, alleged by the 
Hospitals as consumers, "may be of the appropriate type" to 
be remedied by antitrust laws. See id. at 927 (considering 
the same theory offered by the union funds). The District 
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Court therefore incorrectly concluded that claims under the 
direct injury theory are not within congressional intent. Yet, 
this error is inconsequential since the next two factors -- 
the remoteness of the injury and the speculativeness of 
damages -- overwhelm any finding that the direct injury 
claims may be within congressional antitrust concern. 
 
        (4) Factor 4: Directness/Indirectness of the Injury 
 
The directness or indirectness of the injury involves two 
inquiries: (1) the appropriate party, and (2) remoteness. See 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927. As to the appropriate party, 
Steamfitters stated: 
 
       [s]ubsumed in the "directness" factor is also the issue 
       of whether other, more directly injured parties could 
       vindicate the policies underlying the antitrust laws: 
       "The existence of an identifiable class of persons whose 
       self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate 
       the public Iinterest . . . diminishes the justification for 
       allowing a more remote party such as the Union to 
       perform the office of private attorney general." 
 
Id. at 927 (quoting AGC, 459 U.S. at 542). The nonpaying 
patients in the present case, while more directly injured, 
may be unwilling to sue the Tobacco Companies for 
antitrust violations. Moreover, the direct injury theory 
covers some damages that only Hospitals could have  
sustained.8 Thus, the District Court correctly determined 
that the Hospitals seem like the appropriate party. 
 
However, following Steamfitters, the District Court found 
that the Hospitals' injuries were too remote and the chain 
of causation too attenuated to satisfy the directness of 
injury factor. It found that the injuries were indirect and 
derivative of nonpaying patients' smoking injuries, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Tobacco Companies note the possibility that nonpaying patients 
may bring antitrust suits for increased medical expenditures, given 
Pennsylvania's collateral source rule, which allows a patient to recover 
for health costs, even if the patient did not pay those costs. We discuss 
this contention later, eventually declining to resolve the issue since we 
do not rely on the Tobacco Companies' invocation of the collateral source 
rule to support our holding. See Steamfitters , 171 F.3d at 928 n.9. 
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overshadowing the possibility that the Hospitals might be 
the appropriate party. 
 
The Hospitals first argue that an intentional injury 
cannot be indirect. But, as discussed earlier, specific intent 
to harm does not magically create standing or cause alleged 
antitrust injuries to be direct. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 537. 
The Hospitals also argue that their injuries are independent 
and separate from injuries to nonpaying patients, and in 
support, list numerous examples. However, we rejected a 
nearly identical claim in Steamfitters, with language directly 
applicable to the present case: 
 
       [u]nder plaintiffs' direct theory, the tobacco companies' 
       conduct aimed at the [Hospitals] induced the 
       [Hospitals] to not take certain actions, which led to a 
       greater incidence of smoking (and of smokers using 
       more dangerous products), which led to more illness, 
       which led to increased health care expenditures being 
       borne by the plaintiffs. Although the alleged 
       wrongdoing was more directly aimed at the [Hospitals], 
       the injury itself certainly was no more direct than the 
       indirect injury that arose from the defendant's actions 
       toward smokers. . . . [P]laintiff 's direct-injury claim is 
       that the tobacco companies fraudulently induced the 
       [Hospitals] to not spend money (on safer-smoking or 
       smoking-cessation products) that, if spent, would have 
       diminished a separate revenue stream (i.e., smokers' 
       purchase of tobacco products) for the defendants. We 
       view this as an indirect connection. 
 
171 F.3d at 927-28. Of course, the Hospitals are different 
from the union funds in Steamfitters in that they provide 
free medical care, provide it directly, and have a duty to 
provide it. Yet only the direct provision of care is relevant to 
remoteness. Moreover, direct provision does not alter the 
fact that the Hospitals dealt solely with the nonpaying 
patients, and not with the Tobacco Companies. Cf. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health and 
Welfare Trust Fund, 196 F.3d at 827 (rejecting the direct 
payment argument). The Hospitals' injuries are still 
derivative of the nonpaying patients' injuries. As in 
Steamfitters, the Hospitals' injuries are too remotely 
connected in the causal chain from wrongdoing on the part 
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of the Tobacco Companies; thus, the Hospitals' injuries do 
not satisfy the directness of injury factor. See Steamfitters, 
171 F.3d at 927-28. 
 
        (5) Factor 5: Highly Speculative Damages  
 
Faced with similar theories based on increased medical 
costs, Steamfitters held that the union funds' alleged 
damages were highly speculative and difficult to measure. 
See 171 F.3d at 928-29. The District Court found the same 
true of the Hospitals' antitrust claims. 
 
We agree with the District Court that the Hospitals' 
alleged damages are speculative and uncertain. To quote 
Steamfitters: 
 
       [i]n order to calculate damages -- i.e., the costs not 
       lowered due to the antitrust conspiracy -- the 
       [Hospitals] must demonstrate how many smokers 
       would have stopped smoking if provided with smoking- 
       cessation information, how many would have begun 
       smoking less dangerous products, how much healthier 
       these smokers would have been if they had taken these 
       actions, and the savings the [Hospitals] would have 
       realized by paying out fewer claims for smoking-related 
       illnesses. 
 
Id. at 929. All these speculative calculations create a vast 
uncertainty about the Hospitals' damages, and leads us to 
question whether a remediable injury exists. 
 
The Hospitals argue that they can calculate damages 
through aggregation and statistical modeling.9 The union 
funds in Steamfitters made a similar argument, and it was 
rejected. See id. at 929 ("we do not believe that aggregation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Aggregation and statistical modeling are methods of estimating the 
characteristics of an entire population by looking at a sample of that 
population. While the Hospitals offer few specifics, we believe that they 
contemplate sampling a group of nonpaying patients, examining the 
incidence of tobacco use and the average health care costs among that 
sample, and then extrapolating the results of that sample to the entire 
population of nonpaying patients. See generally Michael J. Saks & Peter 
David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation 
and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1992). 
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and statistical modeling are sufficient to get the[plaintiffs] 
over the hurdle of the AGC factor focusing on whether the 
`damages claim is . . . highly speculative' ") (quoting AGC, 
459 U.S. at 542). Both the union funds in Steamfitters and 
the Hospitals here have access to the same information 
base from which to calculate damages. In both contexts, 
that calculation is highly speculative. 
 
Lastly, the Hospitals argue that difficulty in proving 
damages should not prevent the Court from remedying an 
injury, especially where statistical and aggregate evidence is 
well-accepted by courts to show damages and liability. 
Again, Steamfitters responds directly to this point when it 
notes that sometimes: 
 
       [a]ggregation and statistical modeling may be 
       appropriate (though we need not decide that issue 
       here) to allow plaintiffs to overcome the difficulty of 
       proving the amount of damages. . . . In the present 
       context, however, a finding of antitrust standing must 
       precede a finding of liability, which itself precedes an 
       assessment of damages. 
 
Id. at 929 (citations omitted). Similarly, in this case 
standing must be determined first. 
 
        (6) Factor 6: Avoiding Trial Complexity  
 
The final factor is whether the claim is judicially 
manageable in terms of avoiding duplicate recoveries and 
complex apportionment. The District Court found that this 
case did not present significant problems of duplicate 
recoveries or complex apportionment, but acknowledged 
that some apportionment might be required if smokers 
brought their own claims against the Tobacco Companies. 
The Hospitals generally agree. They further add that their 
injuries -- i.e., the costs of providing free health care -- are 
fundamentally different than the nonpaying patients' 
injuries -- i.e., the health damages from smoking and the 
out-of-pocket costs of paying for health care. Thus, the risk 
of duplicate damage claims is extremely limited. The 
Tobacco Companies counter that, under Pennsylvania's 
collateral source rule, nonpaying patients could sue to 
recover the costs of their medical treatment even if they did 
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not pay for that treatment. Thus, they argue that duplicate 
recoveries and apportionment are a real concern. 
 
The collateral source rule provides that payments from a 
third-party to a victim will not lower the damages that the 
victim may recover from a wrongdoer. This rule prevents 
the wrongdoer from benefitting from the third-party's 
payments. See Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96, 100 (Pa. 
1995). The application of this rule to a situation where the 
wrongdoer pays the victim's damages indirectly through a 
third-party suit is unclear. Steamfitters declined to predict 
how Pennsylvania courts would rule on this issue, since it 
did not rely on the invocation of the rule to support its 
holding. See 171 F.3d at 928 n.9. We follow a similar route. 
Since this is an issue of state law, and since the 
indirectness of injury and the speculativeness of damages 
factors already militate so strongly against a finding of 
proximate cause, we choose not to address the application 
of the collateral source rule. Thus, we assume the District 
Court was correct in finding little risk of duplicate 
recoveries and complex apportionment. 
 
* * * 
 
The Hospitals' claims satisfy the first three factors. There 
is a causal connection, the Hospitals allege the Tobacco 
Companies harbored specific intent to harm, and, at least 
for the direct injury theory, the Hospitals' injuries are 
within congressional antitrust concerns. However, these 
three factors are outweighed, as they were in Steamfitters, 
by the sheer remoteness of the Hospitals' injuries from the 
alleged conspiracy. That remoteness is evident in the highly 
speculative nature of the Hospitals' damages claims. This 
deficiency is also manifested in the indirectness of the 
Hospitals' injuries: 
 
        [t]he sheer number of links in the chain of causation 
       that connect the defendants' suppression of 
       information on the dangers of their products and 
       withholding of safer tobacco products from the market 
       to the [Hospitals'] increased expenditures[are simply 
       too great]. . . . The tortured path that one must follow 
       from the tobacco companies' alleged wrongdoing to the 
       [Hospitals'] increased expenditures demonstrates that 
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       the plaintiffs' claims are precisely the type of indirect 
       claims that the proximate cause requirement is 
       intended to weed out. 
 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930. The three distinctions the 
Hospitals offer -- direct provision of health care, free 
provision of health care, and a duty to provide health care 
-- are not significant enough to change the analysis. 
Steamfitters controls: proximate cause is lacking, and the 
Hospitals lack standing to assert their antitrust claims. 
 
       2. RICO Claims 
 
Standing to assert RICO claims requires that the alleged 
RICO violation proximately caused a plaintiff 's injury -- 
i.e., the violation is not too remote from the injury. See 
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 
268 (1992). The principles underlying proximate cause in 
RICO are analogous to those in antitrust, and thus much 
of the previous discussion about antitrust applies here. See 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 932; but see Callahan v. A.E.V., 
Inc., 182 F.3d 237, 263 n.18 (3d Cir. 1999) (where the 
factual underpinning of an antitrust claim and a RICO 
claim are different, the importation of antitrust proximate 
cause analysis may be inappropriate). 
 
The formal factors of proximate cause in RICO are, 
however, slightly different. The three factors are: (1) the 
directness of the injury -- "the more indirect the injury, `the 
more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a 
plaintiff 's damages attributable to [defendant's 
wrongdoing], as distinct from other, independent, factors;' " 
(2) the difficulty of apportioning damages among potential 
plaintiffs -- "allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties 
would require complicated rules for apportioning damages;" 
and, (3) the possibility of other plaintiffs vindicating the 
goals of RICO -- "direct victims could generally be counted 
on to vindicate the policies underlying" RICO in a better 
manner than indirect victims. Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 932 
(quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69). Steamfitters drew on 
its antitrust analysis in finding that the union funds' RICO 
claims were too remote for proximate cause or standing. 
See id. at 933-34. The District Court applied the same 
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principles to the Hospitals' RICO claims and reached the 
same conclusion. The Hospitals argue that the District 
Court erred. 
 
Again, there are three differences between the union 
funds' claims and the Hospitals' claims -- the direct 
provision of medical care, the free provision of medical care, 
and the duty to provide medical care. We believe that none 
of these differences are significant enough to change the 
RICO standing analysis; therefore the result in Steamfitters 
governs. 
 
       a. The Directness of the Injury 
 
This factor addresses the difficulty of ascertaining 
damages traceable to the Tobacco Companies' conduct. As 
we noted in discussing the antitrust claims, the Hospitals' 
injuries are remote and indirect, and there is much 
uncertainty and speculation about what would have 
happened to the Hospitals had the Tobacco Companies not 
conspired. See Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 
191 F.3d at 240 ("sheerest sort of speculation to determine 
how these damages might have been lessened had the 
Funds adopted [special] measures"). Reasoning from 
Steamfitters is directly applicable: 
 
       if the [Hospitals] are allowed to sue, the court would 
       need to determine the extent to which their increased 
       costs for smoking-related illnesses resulted from the 
       tobacco companies' conspiracy to suppress health and 
       safety information, as opposed to smokers' other health 
       problems, smokers' independent (i.e., separate from the 
       fraud and conspiracy) decisions to smoke, smokers' 
       ignoring of health and safety warnings, etc. . . .[T]his 
       causation chain is much too speculative and 
       attenuated to support a RICO claim. 
 
171 F.3d at 933 (footnote omitted). Like the Court in 
Steamfitters, we find that the Hospitals' injuries are 
indirect. Neither the duty to provide medical care, nor the 




10. The Hospitals raise the same arguments here as they did in support 
of their antitrust claims. For the same reasons as in that discussion, we 
reject those arguments. 
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       b. The Difficulty in Apportioning Damages Among 
       Plaintiffs 
 
Directly injured parties like the nonpaying patients are 
unlikely to bring RICO claims against the Tobacco 
Companies. We recognize, however, the uncertainty over 
whether the collateral source rule would allow nonpaying 
patients to recover health care costs which they did not 
incur. For the same reasons as in our discussion of 
antitrust standing, we decline to resolve this uncertainty 
and assume that problems of apportionment would not be 
significant. 
 
       c. The Possibility of Other Plaintiffs Vindicating 
       RICO's Goals 
 
Again, it is unclear whether nonpaying patients can 
recover from the Tobacco Companies, since the Hospitals 
bore the burden of the unreimbursed medical expenses. 
Thus, the Hospitals may be the most appropriate party to 
vindicate the purposes of RICO. We assume other plaintiffs 
are not willing to recover. 
 
       d. Summary 
 
In summary, while the Hospitals may be the best party to 
vindicate RICO claims and problems of apportionment may 
not be significant, "the remoteness of the[Hospitals'] 
alleged RICO injuries from any wrongdoing on the part of 
the [T]obacco [C]ompanies" leads us to conclude that 
proximate cause is lacking. Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 933- 
34. The differences between the Hospitals' injuries and the 
union funds' injuries in Steamfitters are not significant 
enough to overcome remoteness. Therefore, the Hospitals 
lack standing to assert RICO claims. 
 
C. Proximate Cause and Public Policy 
 
Perhaps sensing that their antitrust and RICO claims are 
materially the same as those dismissed in Steamfitters, the 
Hospitals argue that justice and sound public policy dictate 
that they have standing to sue. The Hospitals cite two 
district court opinions that take this view. See Blue 
Cross/Nat'l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund, 36 F. Supp. 2d 
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at 584 ("The moral blame attached to [the Tobacco 
Companies'] conduct, and society's policy in preventing 
harms in the future, could scarcely argue more strongly in 
favor of a finding of proximate cause."); Service Employees 
Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 84- 
85 ("If Plaintiffs can ultimately prove their allegations, can 
there really be any doubt that sound public policy demands 
that they be given an opportunity to do so?") (footnote 
omitted). 
 
These cases are problematic. First, they are district court 
cases from other circuits. Second, the Courts of Appeals 
have neither approved nor adopted their holdings. See, e.g., 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health and 
Welfare Trust Fund, 196 F.3d at 827 ("[Judge Weinstein's] 
decision in [Blue Cross/Nat'l Asbestos Workers Medical 
Fund] fails to anticipate the second circuit's conclusion in 
Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund; the .. . decision 
is a thinly disguised refusal to accept and follow the second 
circuit's holding.") Third, to the extent those decisions offer 
a "justice-based" conception of proximate cause and 
standing for antitrust and RICO claims, they run contrary 
to Steamfitters. 
 
For the record, we believe here that sound public policy 
argues against proximate cause and standing. When an 
injury is indirect, remote, and many steps away from the 
alleged cause, it is unadvisable to allow a case to proceed. 
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 
1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("What we do mean by the 
word `proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public 
policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily 
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point."). 
The Hospitals are dangerously close to asserting that they 
have standing to sue any company that causes a nonpaying 
patient's disease or illness. For example, could the 
hospitals sue a group of auto manufacturers for the 
unreimbursed costs of treating nonpaying patients injured 
in car accidents, simply by alleging that the manufacturers 
conspired to keep defective vehicles on the road? See Assoc. 
of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. We 
doubt that would be in the interests of public policy. 
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It is beyond dispute that the Tobacco Companies have 
engaged in "decades-long marketing of a product that we 
now know is demonstrably unsafe." Steamfitters, 171 F.3d 
at 927. At times, courts have ordered compensation. See, 
e.g., Amy Driscoll, Jurors Call $145 Billion Tobacco Verdict 
a `Message'; Florida Panel Members Say Record Award Is 
Firms' Penalty for Lying, Wash. Post, July 16, 2000, at A2 
(a Florida jury returns $145 billion verdict in a class action 
suit against tobacco companies). We express no view on the 
propriety of such compensation. We simply hold that, due 
to the remoteness of the Hospitals' injuries, this third-party 
suit against the tobacco industry may not proceed. 11 
 
III. State Common Law Claims 
 
In addition to their antitrust and RICO claims, the 
Hospitals raise numerous state common law claims. We 
find these to be without merit. 
 
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent 
       Concealment, Negligent Misrepresentation and 
       Omission, and Special Duty Claims (Counts VI, VII, 
       VIII, and IX) 
 
The Hospitals raise claims of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligent 
misrepresentation and omission, and special duty against 
the Tobacco Companies. Proximate cause is an element of 
each of these claims. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 934-35, 
937 n.23. Here, proximate cause is lacking due to the 
remoteness of the Hospitals' injury in relation to the 
Tobacco Companies' alleged conspiracy and the 
speculativeness of damages. Therefore, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Another parallel argument that the Hospitals raise is that we should 
interpret RICO standing broadly. (Br. of Appellant at 46 (citing Blue 
Cross/Nat'l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund and N.O.W. v. Scheidler, 510 
U.S. 249 (1994)). As explained in the text, Judge Weinstein's Blue 
Cross/Nat'l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund opinion is questionable given 
prevailing Second Circuit doctrine. Moreover, Scheidler deals with an 
entirely different factual situation. See 510 U.S. 249 (plaintiff clinics 
alleged that defendants conspired to threaten staff and patients in order 
to destroy clinics' business). Generally, RICO should be interpreted 
broadly, but not so broadly as to eviscerate any connection between 
alleged wrongdoing and harm. 
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correctly dismissed these state common law claims. See id. 
at 934 ("The same principles that lead us to conclude that 
plaintiffs' antitrust and RICO claims were properly 
dismissed lead to the inevitable conclusion that their 
statelaw claims must also fail."). 
 
B. Remaining Claims 
 
The Hospitals' remaining claims of public nuisance, 
aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy, restitution, unjust 
enrichment, quantum meruit, and indemnity do not require 
proximate cause. The District Court therefore considered 
the merits of each. The Tobacco Companies urge this Court 
to read a proximate cause requirement into these claims, 
arguing that the remoteness doctrine and the direct injury 
requirement would be meaningless if plaintiffs could 
circumvent these principles by creative labeling of their 
claims. Since we agree with the District Court that the 
remaining claims fail on other grounds, we decline to adopt 
their suggestion. 
 
       1. Public Nuisance Claim (Count X) 
 
"[A] public nuisance is `an unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public.' " Philadelphia Elec. 
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 821B(1) (1979)). In 
order to recover damages in a private action for public 
nuisance, a plaintiff must have suffered a harm of greater 
magnitude and of a different kind than that which the 
general public suffered. See id.; see also Pennsylvania Soc'y 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters., 
Inc., 237 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa. 1968). The law requires greater 
and different injury because (1) it is difficult to "draw[ ] any 
satisfactory line for [any] public nuisance" and (2) "to avoid 
multiplicity of actions[,] invasions of rights common to all of 
the public should be left to be remedied by public action by 
officials." Restatement (Second) of Torts S 821C cmt. b 
(1979). 
 
The District Court found that the Hospitals did not 
sufficiently allege that they suffered a harm different from 
and of greater magnitude than the harm suffered by the 
general public. We agree. The Hospitals' injuries are 
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derivative of the nonpaying patients' injuries, and the 
Hospitals are one of numerous parties in the public harmed 
by the alleged conspiracy. In these circumstances, 
remedying the source of the conspiracy is more properly a 
task for public officials. The District Court correctly 
dismissed the public nuisance claim. 
 
       2. Aiding and Abetting and Civil Conspiracy Claims 
       (Counts XI and XV) 
 
Aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy claims require 
an underlying tort cause of action. See Strickland v. 
University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987-88 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997) (elements of civil conspiracy); Caplan v. Fellheimer 
Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 884 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. 
Pa. 1995) ("[a] claim for civil conspiracy can proceed only 
when there is a cause of action for an underlying act"). The 
District Court dismissed the aiding and abetting and civil 
conspiracy claims for lack of an underlying action, and we 
uphold that dismissal. The Hospitals do not dispute this 
reasoning, though they argue that an underlying cause of 
action exists in the antitrust, RICO, and other state law 
claims. 
 
       3. Restitution, Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit 
       (Counts XIII and XIV) 
 
In discussing unjust enrichment claims, the Steamfitters 
Court explained: 
 
       [i]n the tort setting, an unjust enrichment claim is 
       essentially another way of stating a traditional tort 
       claim. . . . [There is] no justification for permitting 
       plaintiffs to proceed on their unjust enrichment claim 
       once [it is] determined that the District Court properly 
       dismissed the traditional tort claims . . . 
 
171 F.3d at 936-37. Following this reasoning, the District 
Court dismissed the Hospitals' restitution and unjust 
enrichment claims against the Tobacco Companies since 
the traditional tort claims were properly dismissed. We 
believe this is a proper reading of Steamfitters. 
 
The Hospitals now argue that their unjust enrichment 
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claim is not based in tort, but rather in an implied contract 
for the benefit they conferred on the Tobacco Companies by 
providing care to nonpaying patients.12  This argument 
dresses the unjust enrichment claim in quantum meruit 
terms. "Quantum meruit is a quasi-contractual remedy in 
which a contract is implied-in-law under a theory of unjust 
enrichment; the contract is one that is implied in law, and 
`not an actual contract at all.' " Hershey Foods Corp. v. 
Ralph Chapek, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Bethel Mart Assocs., 454 
A.2d 599, 603 (1982)). The Hospitals' quantum meruit 
claim is based on the theory that by paying for the medical 
services required by nonpaying patients, the Hospitals 
discharged the Tobacco Companies' legal duties and saved 
them from bearing costs caused by their fraudulent and 
wrongful conduct. The District Court found this claim to be 
without merit. 
 
We agree. "Unjust enrichment is . . . an equitable 
doctrine[, with the following elements:] benefits conferred 
on one party by another, appreciation of such benefits by 
the recipient, and acceptance and retention of these 
benefits under such circumstances that it would be 
inequitable [or unjust] for the recipient to retain the 
benefits without payment of value." 16 Summary of Pa. Jur. 
2d Commercial Law S 2.2 (1994) (citing various cases). In 
the present case, the Tobacco Companies had no legal 
obligation to pay the medical expenses of smokers, and 
thus the Hospitals' provision of medical services did not 
"benefit" the Tobacco Companies by removing their 
obligation. Cf. Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare 
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 
1999) (discussing unjust enrichment under Oregon law) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We reject the Hospitals' contention that there was an implied 
contract between the Hospitals and the Tobacco Companies in which the 
latter implicitly promised to compensate the Hospitals for unreimbursed 
medical care. The claim that the Hospitals reasonably expected to be 
paid is not supported by their factual allegations and is inconsistent 
with a major factual premise of their case -- that they did not know of 
the Tobacco Companies' conspiracy. Under no set of facts alleged can we 
find that the Tobacco Companies ever implicitly promised to pay for 
these services. 
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("Without a legal obligation on the part of defendants to 
pay, the payment by plaintiffs did not `benefit' 
defendants."). In addition, since the Hospitals had an 
independent obligation to provide health care to nonpaying 
patients, incidental benefit to the Tobacco Companies is not 
enough to maintain an action; the nonpaying patients got 
the main benefit, not the Tobacco Companies. See 
Restatement of Restitution S 106 (1937) ("A person who, 
incidentally to the performance of his own duty . . . has 
conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to 
contribution."). 
 
Even if some benefit went to the Tobacco Companies, it 
is unclear that allowing them to retain it is unjust. First, 
the benefit was incidental to the Hospitals' performance of 
its duty, and second, the Hospitals did not have a 
reasonable expectation of payment from the Tobacco 
Companies. See Aloe Coal Co. v. Department of Transp., 643 
A.2d 757, 767 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (incidental benefit 
and lack of expectation by plaintiffs showed that benefit 
was not unjust). Lastly, the distance between the Hospitals' 
provision of medical care and the Tobacco Companies' 
alleged benefit show that the benefit was not unjust. For all 
these reasons we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the 
Hospitals' quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims. 
 
       4. Indemnity Based on Intentional and/or Reckless 
       Conduct Claim (Count XII) 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, indemnity is available only (1) 
"where there is an express contract to indemnify," or (2) 
where the party seeking indemnity is vicariously or 
secondarily liable for the indemnitor's acts. Richardson v. 
John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 838 F. Supp. 979, 989 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993). The Hospitals acknowledge that no express 
contract existed and that they are not secondarily liable. 
Thus, the District Court correctly held that, under 




For all the foregoing reasons, the District Court's 
dismissal of the Hospitals' complaint will be affirmed. 
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